Introduction
Among challenges to the descriptive validity of the expected utility hypothesis, none is more widely studied than Allais' (1953) common consequence effect, an example of which is shown below.
G1: $500,000 with probability 1 G2: $2,500,000 with probability 0.10 $500,000 with probability 0.89 0 with probability 0.01 G3: $500,000 with probability 0.11 G4: $2,500,000 with probability 0.10 0 with probability 0.89 0 with probability 0.90
When asked to choose between G1 and G2 and between G3 and G4, many people, including prominent decision theorists like Leonard Savage, exhibit more risk aversion in the first choice than in the second, finding G1 more attractive than G2, and G4 more attractive than G3. This pattern violates expected utility theory. One suggested explanation is that people overweight certainty relative to possibility, as captured by the weighting function in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) original version of prospect theory. Savage (1954, p. 102) suggested that people choose G1 over G2 because "they do not find the chance of winning a very large fortune in place of receiving a large fortune outright adequate compensation for even a small risk of being left at the status quo" and select G4 over G3 because "the chance of winning is nearly the same in both gambles, so the larger prize appears preferable." Savage then reframes the choice problems as a state-based matrix where states across choice alternatives are correlated (shown below).
Ticket Numbers 1 2 -11 12 -100 G1: $500,000 $500,000 $500,000 G2: 0 $2,500,000 $500,000
G3: $500,000 $500,000 0 G4: 0 $2,500,000 0
In these reframed options, the prize depends on the draw of a ticket from a bag containing 100 numbered tickets. Given this reframing, Savage chose in accordance with the independence axiom and in a consistently risk averse manner, expressing a preference for G1 over G2 and for G3 over G4. Savage felt that his revision of the latter choice, brought about by this new frame, had "corrected an error" (p. 103).
Three decades later, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) presented additional and, perhaps, even more compelling evidence of decision errors that are sensitive to framing. They report that all 88 of their experimental subjects chose B over A given the choice shown below, in which probabilities of outcomes in each option are expressed as percentages of marbles of different colors in a box governing each option: 
Option

2% yellow lose $15
The choice of C versus D reframes that between A and B. Option C is obtained from A by combining the 1% blue and 2% yellow chances of losing $15 while D is obtained from B by combining the 6% red and 1% green chances of winning $45. 1 This produces an economical or 'minimal' presentation in the sense that the matrix has fewer columns; yet this presentation masks the dominance relation and, moreover, juxtaposes the 1% chance of $30 against the 1% chance of -$10, which now drives the choice.
Intuitively the dominance relationship is 'more transparent' in the choice between options A and B.
However, in addition to such intuitions concerning relative transparency-as held by Savage (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) -is there also a logic of transparency that can be formalized and generalized to a wider class of decision problems? Commenting on the Tversky and Kahneman (1986) paper, Hogarth and Reder (1986) note that "Tversky and Kahneman do not specify the conditions under which people perceive problems as transparent or opaque" (p. S192). This issue has apparently not been addressed in the subsequent literature: there is no general theory of 'transparency' of choice presentations.
We offer precise definitions of presentations or frames for choice under risk and over time, propose a property list for transparent frames, and show that these properties imply unique presentations of choice problems. We also define a minimal frame and identify it with many standard presentations of choice problems. We then apply a model of salience-based choice to derive behavioral predictions in minimal and transparent frames, and test for these predicted choice differences in a new experiment involving choice under risk. Finally, we extend the model to choice under ambiguity, where we derive the novel prediction that ambiguity aversion is frame-dependent. 
Presentations or
Lotteries, Income Streams and their Frames
Frames present pairs of options as shown above in Figure 1 . Let be a finite set of potential outcomes.
A lottery is a mapping : → [0,1] such that ∑ ( ) = 1 ∈ , and ∆( ) is the set of all such lotteries. Now consider a pair of one-dimensional finite arrays and , representing lotteries and and offering a finite and equal number of outcomes denoted and , = 1,2, … , , where each occurs with probability and each occurs with probability : The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the pair of arrays. We call ⟦ , ⟧ a frame or presentation of lottery pair { , }, and say that ⟦ , ⟧ presents { , }, if and only if ( ) = ∑ { | = } and ( ) = ∑ { | = } . Let ( ) denote the support of (the set of outcomes such that ( ) > 0). Note that may exceed | ( )| and/or | ( )|, where | ( )| denotes the number of outcomes in a support: This is a key difference between frames ⟦ , ⟧ and the pairs { , } they present.
For decisions over discrete time periods i ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, T}, intertemporal income streams r and t are finite sequences of outcomes, each assigning one outcome to each period. Denote the set of income streams by . We also study choices between income streams and , where : = ( 0 , 1 , … , ) and : = ( 0 , 1 , … , ). Here, a frame ⟦ , ⟧ is again a pair of one-dimensional finite arrays and representing income streams and and offering a finite and equal number of outcomes, where each outcome occurs in time period and each occurs in period : The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates such a pair of arrays. Bold fonts denote attributes as presented in a frame, while italicized fonts denote the underlying lotteries, income streams and the attributes in their supports.
Defining Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames
We provide here an intuitive treatment of minimal and transparent frames (our appendix gives formal definitions and uniqueness demonstrations). Transparent frames are reminiscent of Savage's (1954) state matrix representation of lotteries, but assume neither statistical independence nor correlation between payoffs. Minimal frames are compact presentations of choices and, for choice under risk, formalize the 'prospect' presentation of lotteries pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Minimal frames for choice under risk contain no redundancy: the same outcome does not appear in the representation of a lottery more than once. Similarly, in minimal frames for choice over time, any time period appears just once in presentations of income streams, and the frame contains the fewest columns necessary to present (all of the non-zero payoffs in) the income streams.
Though both Savage (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued that people are more likely to make better decisions when choices are presented in a more transparent format, it appears that no prior
work precisely articulated what properties would characterize a transparent presentation of decisions. To address this gap, we propose that a transparent frame for lotteries satisfies properties 1 -5:
1. Common Consequence Separation: Identify the common consequences (the payoff-probability pairs that contain the same outcomes and corresponding probabilities) of the lotteries being compared and separate them from distinct consequences (the other payoff-probability pairs in the frame).
Monotonicity:
Order the outcomes of distinct consequences in decreasing order such that the i th best outcome in one lottery is in the same column as the i th best outcome in the other lottery.
Alignment:
Set the probabilities within each column equal to each other.
Completeness:
Ensure that the probabilities for each row in the frame sum to 1.
Relevance:
Ensure the probabilities in each column vector are positive.
Our appendix provides an algorithm for constructing a unique transparent frame satisfying these five properties for any lottery pair (including those with different numbers of outcomes in their support).
The five properties serve as heuristics for framing a decision to help articulate and focus on the relevant information: Together they simplify comparison of alternatives. The properties also have intuitive appeal.
The common consequence separation property isolates shared payoff-probability pairs in lotteries, thus focusing attention on how the lotteries differ. Monotonicity ensures that the best payoffs in one lottery are compared to the best payoffs in another lottery. The alignment property sets the probabilities equal within each column vector in a frame so that when comparing any payoff-probability pair in the same column, one need only compare the two payoffs. The completeness property ensures that all outcomes in the support of a lottery are included so that all information about the choice alternatives is accounted for in the decision.
The relevance property ensures that no irrelevant outcomes (those with probability zero) are considered.
The properties may help a person focus on the tradeoffs needed to make a quality decision.
Common Consequence Separation:
Identify the common consequences (the payoff-time pairs that contain the same outcomes and the same corresponding delays) of the income streams being compared and separate them from distinct consequences.
Monotonicity:
Order the timing of distinct consequences in strictly increasing order such that the i th soonest period in one income stream is in the same column as the i th soonest period in the other.
Alignment:
Set the time periods within each column equal to each other.
Completeness:
Ensure that all time periods indexed by the income streams are included.
Relevance:
Ensure that only time periods indexed by the income streams are included.
These five properties also have intuitive appeal and justification. Common consequence separation puts attention on where the two alternatives differ. Monotonicity reflects the intuition that time has a natural forward direction and it may help one to consider time periods sequentially. The alignment property ensures that the time periods within each column of a frame are the same, standardizing outcomes within each column to have the same 'time value of money'. Alignment also enables a decision maker who is comparing two payoff-time pairs in a given pair of columns to focus on the differences in payoffs, rather than trading off both risk and time within those columns. Completeness ensures that all relevant time periods and payoffs are considered. The relevance property ensures that only relevant time periods and payoffs are considered.
In particular, it encourages the decision maker to be forward looking as it does not display sunk costs (e.g., from previous income outcomes) that occurred prior to the dates indexed by the income streams. We show in the appendix that for any pair of income streams there is a unique frame satisfying these five properties. Leland and Schneider's (2017) Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP) is a simple decision model that operates on frames as we define them here. 2 SWUP predicts differences between choice behavior for minimal and transparent frames, so we now briefly motivate and review the SWUP model.
Salience Weighted Utility over Presentations
Salience Weighted Utility of Presentations for Choice under Risk
In a standard expected utility model of choice under risk, is chosen over if and only if (1) holds:
where ( ) is a utility function denoting payoffs to the decision maker from outcomes . 3 Leland and Schneider (2017) consider choices over frames as in the top panel of Figure 1 , where (1) can be written equivalently as (2). (We use bold font to denote outcomes and probabilities in a frame):
, Inequality (1) pertains to choices over lotteries and (regardless of how they are framed), whereas (2) pertains to choices over a particular frame ⟦ , ⟧ presenting lotteries and . Note that (1) and (2) provide an alternative-based evaluation -one lottery is strictly preferred to another, if and only if it yields a greater expected payoff to the decision maker.
Building on Leland and Sileo (1998) , the alternative-based evaluation in (2) may be rewritten equivalently as an attribute-based evaluation such that is chose over if and only if (3) holds:
Note that (2) and (3) operate over frames rather than over lotteries directly. Leland and Schneider (2017) then allow for the possibility that the agent systematically overweights salient differences in probabilities and payoffs by introducing salience weights ( , ) on probability differences and ( , ) on payoff differences. This yields Leland and Schneider's Salience-Weighted Utility over Presentations (SWUP) model of choice under risk, in which is chosen over if and only if
Salience Weighted Utility for Choice over Time
The SWUP model extends to choices over time as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 . In the discounted utility model, a person always chooses income stream over if and only if (5) holds:
, where δ is a constant discount factor. Through an analogous development to (4), Leland and Schneider (2017) propose (6) as the corresponding generalization of discounted utility theory to allow for overweighting salient differences in payoffs and time delays. Placing salience weights ( , ) on time differences and ( , ) on payoff differences gives this salience-weighted evaluation in which is always chosen over if and only if
whenever the frame ⟦ , ⟧ presents income streams and . Leland and Schneider (2017) introduced SWUP for choices under risk and over time. Here we extend SWUP to the domain of uncertainty, where probabilities of some events are unknown. Suppose there is a finite set of possible states of nature ∈ {1,2, … , }, where a lottery is assigned to be played in each state.
Salience Weighted Utility for Choice under Ambiguity
Denote uncertain prospects by and , where assigns lottery ( ) to each state and assigns lottery ( ) to each state . In the classic alternative-based evaluation, there is assumed to be a unique subjective probability distribution, , over states (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) such that is preferred over if and only if (7) holds (where ( ) is the probability of outcome in state ):
Let there be a frame for each state, where indexes the i th attribute in the frame in state . Given two multidimensional arrays = { , … , } and = { , … , }, the analogous formula to (5) is is always chosen over if and only if (8) holds:
.
Next, we introduce the corresponding model of salience-weighted evaluation in which is always chosen over if and only if (9) holds:
We refer to agents who choose according to salience-based evaluation models (the representations 4, 6, and 9) as focal thinkers since such agents focus on salient differences in attributes. Such an agent chooses the alternative which 'looks better' with respect to that agent's perceptual system.
Properties of Salience Perceptions
The salience functions , and determine the only ways in which the behavior of a focal thinker differs from a rational agent who chooses according to formulas 1, 5 and 7. We assume a salience function exhibits the two properties of the perceptual system in Definition 1, introduced by Bordalo et al. (2012) .
Definition 1 (Salience Function):
A salience function σ( , ) is any continuous, non-negative and symmetric (σ( , ) = σ( , )) function of and ∈ ℝ that satisfies the following two properties:
2. Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): σ(. ) exhibits diminishing sensitivity if for any , , > 0, σ( + , + ) < σ( , ).
In addition to properties 1 and 2 from Bordalo et al. (2012) , we will allow for the possibility that a salience function satisfies a third property, increasing proportional sensitivity:
3. Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS): σ(. ) exhibits increasing proportional sensitivity if for any
There is a close relationship between DAS and IPS: DAS implies that for a fixed absolute difference, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger ratios, while IPS implies that for a fixed ratio, the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger absolute differences. We will show that for focal thinkers, IPS for implies the general version of the Allais common ratio effect, and DAS for implies ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg's paradox in minimal frame presentations. Our approach thus provides a unified treatment of Allais-style and Ellsberg-style behavior and shows that they can be derived from basic properties of the probability salience function without requiring any parametric assumptions about the underlying salience functions or utility functions.
Minimal and Transparent Frames for Choice under Risk
We now consider what SWUP implies when alternatives are presented in a minimal versus a transparent frame, beginning with choices under risk. For frames with degenerate lotteries (those yielding a single outcome with probability 1), it seems almost unavoidable that one compares each outcome in the non-degenerate lottery to the unique outcome in the degenerate lottery . So when one lottery in a pair is degenerate, we adopt the convention that monotone minimal frames appear as shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2. Choice Frame with a Degenerate Lottery
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) … ( , ) ( , ) … ( , ) ( , ) … … … …
The Stochastic Dominance Axiom in Minimal and Transparent Frames
One of the most basic axioms of rational choice is consistency with first-order stochastic dominance:
If a lottery offers at least as good an outcome at every probability increment as a lottery and offers a strictly better outcome at some probability increment, then stochastically dominates . Consider again the example due to Tversky and Kahneman (1986) from Section 2, shown in Figure 3 . Given a transparent presentation of lotteries and , all subjects chose the stochastically dominant alternative, (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) . However, when presented in a minimal frame as ' and ' many subjects violated dominance. Similar dominance violations have also been observed in several studies by Birnbaum and his colleagues (e.g., Birnbaum and Navarette, 1998; Birnbaum, 1999) . For transparent frames, a focal thinker will satisfy stochastic dominance. Since payoffs are ordered monotonically, any differences in (3) will favor the stochastically dominant lottery.
The Independence Axiom in Minimal and Transparent Frames
The Allais common consequence paradox (Allais, 1953) involves choices like those in the left panel of Figure 4 . A decision maker chooses between lottery , offering $2400 with certainty and a lottery , offering a 33% chance of $2500, a 66% chance of $2400, and a 1% chance of $0. The decision maker then chooses between lottery � offering a 34% chance of $2400 and lottery � offering a 33% chance of $2500.
In such choices, most subjects choose over and choose � over � (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . This preference pattern is inconsistent with EU which predicts preferences of either and � or and �. In the choice between and in minimal frames, the comparison of 2400 and 0 is more salient than that of 2500 and 2400, which favors . However, in the choice between � and �, the comparison between 2400 and 0 is not cued. Instead, the decision maker compares the upside of winning 2500 instead of 2400
with the downside of forfeiting a 1% chance in the probability of winning. To the extent this $100 difference is more salient than the 0.01 difference in probabilities, the decision maker chooses � over �. Now consider the transparent frames in Figure 4 . Here, the components common to each decision (i.e., ($2400, 0.66) in the choice between and and ($0, 0.66) in the choice between � and �) are isolated and the decision in both cases depends on comparisons between 2500 and 2400 and between 2400 and 0.
Many scholars replicated Allais' (1953) demonstration of common consequence violations in minimal frames, but there is only mixed evidence regarding the prediction that common consequence effects will not occur in transparent frames. Moskowitz (1974) examined common consequence choice pairs presented either in a minimal written form as in the introduction, as tree diagrams, or as transparent matrices like the one proposed by Savage and shown in the introduction. Contrary to our predictions, there were no differences in the proportion of consistent responses among subjects given written or matrix presentations, although both were higher than for tree diagrams. However, Keller (1985) , Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher (2012) and Harman and Gonzalez (2015) all find that more transparent presentations reduce the occurrence of common consequence violations. In their summary, Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher say, "We find that given a transparent presentation, expected utility theory performs surprisingly well, and that the alternative theories perform poorly except inasmuch as they make the same predictions as expected utility theory."
Allais ' (1953) common ratio effect is a second well-known violation of EU. Figure 5 displays a classic version due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . The minimal frames display a choice between lotteries and , offering an 80% chance of $4000 versus $3000 with certainty, and a choice between � and �, offering a 20% chance of $4000 versus a 25% chance of $3000. In this example, a majority of subjects chose over and chose � over � when the choices were presented in minimal frames. This response pattern violates EU which predicts choices of either and � or and �. In the transparent frames in Figure 5 , the salient comparisons in both choices are between 3000 and 0 and between 4000 and 3000. Since the same comparisons are focal in both choices, one might predict more consistent behavior in transparent frames. Another group was presented with choices in a minimal 'tickets' frame in the bottom of Figure 6 . As predicted by SWUP, Harless found that deviations from EU were unsystematic in the transparent frame and systematic and in the predicted Allais direction in the minimal frame. Harless also examined how different juxtapositions of payoffs across choices would influence the incidence and direction of common ratio violations in matrix frames. Those results are also consistent with the predictions of SWUP. 4 Keller (1985) also found that proportional matrix presentations reduce the occurrence of common ratio violations; yet attractive. SWUP explains event splitting effects when splitting an event transforms a presentation from a minimal to a transparent frame, but not when the probabilities within each column vector of a frame are aligned in both presentations (so that salient payoff comparisons are the same in original and split frames).
Minimal Tickets Presentation
An Experiment on Framing and Decisions under Risk
Our experiment compares the predictions of three models -the leading normative model of decision making (EU), cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , and the model of salience weighted utility over presentations (SWUP). Since the outcomes in our experiment involve only gains, the predictions of CPT coincide with those of rank-dependent utility (RDU) due to Quiggin (1982) .
We use SWUP instead of the salience-based model in Bordalo et al. (2012) since our focus is on framing effects. The model in Bordalo et al. (2012) does not predict framing effects between minimal and transparent frames, but instead predicts choices are sensitive to correlations between lotteries.
We test general properties of the models. Choices satisfy stochastic dominance, independence and the property called frame invariance (different presentations of the same two lotteries will produce the same observed choices) under EU. RDU violates the EU independence axiom (allowing Allais paradoxes), but satisfies both stochastic dominance and frame-invariance. SWUP violates frame invariance, and makes the strong prediction that the independence axiom and stochastic dominance will be violated in minimal frames, but will be satisfied in transparent frames. However, we designed our experiment with a secondary purpose in mind: to support estimation of parametric probabilistic choice versions of EU, RDU and SWUP.
Experimental Procedure
Our 137 experimental subjects 5 were undergraduate students at a university in the western United
States in April and May of 2016. We seated subjects at visually isolated computer terminals in lab cubicles.
Each subject chose one lottery from a lottery pair (no indifference permitted) for 100 distinct pairs presented sequentially one at a time on a computer screen. After completing their 100 choices, each subject rolled a pair of ten-sided dice, randomly selecting one of their 100 chosen lotteries to count for payment: The subject then played out that lottery by selecting a numbered raffle ticket from an opaque bag, receiving a cash outcome to keep along with a promised flat $7.00 for timely arrival and participation. Table 1 shows predictions made by EU, CPT/RDU, and SWUP in our design. Under EU we should observe none of the usual regularities and frame invariance of choices. While CPT/RDU permit common ratio effects and Allais' Paradox, they rule out dominance violations and also imply frame invariance.
SWUP predicts that none of the regularities are observed in transparent frames, but that all of them can be observed in minimal frames (and hence does not predict frame invariance). For instance, even with linear utility, SWUP explain the classical versions of the common consequence effect and common ratio effect in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the violation of stochastic dominance in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) in minimal frames, but SWUP satisfies independence and stochastic dominance in transparent frames.
Results: Hypothesis Tests
Experimental results in the two common ratio groups of pairs appear in the two panels of Figure Experimental results in the four Allais Paradox (common consequence) groups of pairs appear in the four panels of Figure 9 . Each group has a pair 1 {S 1 , R 1 } and a pair 2 {S 2 , R 2 } formed from pair 1 by changing a common consequence to zero. We presented these pairs in both minimal and transparent frames, so two choice proportions are graphed above each pair. As in Figure 8 , the solid (double) line connects minimal (transparent) frame observed risky lottery choice proportions within each group, and we show the ratio group, the difference between the minimal and transparent frames of {S,R} is slight: SWUP predicts no difference between these choices, 7 and the data bear this out. However the pair 2 choice proportions always differ strongly across the two types of frames: as in the common ratio groups, transparent framing strongly promotes the choice of safe lotteries relative to minimal framing.
In these groups, under Conlisk's (1989) constant error model and EU, proportions of non-EU choice patterns S 1 ∪ R 2 and R 1 ∪ S 2 should be equivalent. Asterisks above each confidence interval in Figure 9 indicate rejection of this hypothesis (* at 5%, and ** at 1%) by a likelihood ratio test. Figure 9 shows that this hypothesis is almost always rejected in both minimal and transparent frames; but there is a strong difference in the direction of the rejection across these frame types. As predicted by both CPT/RDU and SWUP, we observe the pattern S 1 ∪ R 2 significantly more than the pattern R 1 ∪ S 2 in minimal frames: This is the 'classic' Allais result (and so labeled in Figure 9 ). However, significant 'reverse' Allais results appear in three of the four groups in transparent frames (S 1 ∪ R 2 occurs significantly less often than R 1 ∪ S 2 ) and no theory we know of predicts this. SWUP predicts that no significant Allais pattern (classic or reverse)
should appear in transparent frames-as observed in group B, but not in groups A, C, and D.
Choice patterns S 1 ∪ S 2 and R 1 ∪ R 2 (in each Allais Paradox group) and choice patterns S ∪ S′ and R ∪ R′ (in each common ratio group) are consistent with EU. The left panel of Figure 10 shows how rates of EU consistency vary across transparent frames (the white bars) and minimal frames (the black bars). In all twelve pairs of pairs, EU consistency in transparent frames exceeds that in minimal frames, with nine of these twelve comparisons significant (at 10% or better) by likelihood ratio tests. The right panel of Figure   10 compares risk tolerance in minimal and transparent frames. In this case we use only data from the
Figure 10. EU Consistency and Risk Tolerance in Minimal and Transparent Frames
common ratio pairs {S ′ , R ′ } with common ratios less than 1 (where the minimal and transparent frames actually differ from one another) and pair 2 {S 2 , R 2 } from each Allais Paradox group (recall that SWUP predicts no difference between the minimal and transparent framings of pair 1 in each common consequence group; see Figure 4 and fn. 5). Frame invariance (implied by EU and CPT/RDU) predicts that risk tolerance (R′ or R 2 choice proportions) should not significantly differ between frames, while SWUP predicts greater risk tolerance in minimal frames. In all twelve comparisons (and significantly at 1% or better), risky choice proportions are greater in minimal than transparent frames: On average across these twelve pairs, risky choice proportions are 30.9 percentage points higher in minimal (than transparent) frames.
We expect that, as predicted by SWUP, dominance violations will be common in minimal frames (which is not predicted by EU or CPT/RDU) but very rare in transparent frames and our data bears this out.
In transparent framings of the dominance violation pairs DV.A, DV.B and DV.C, dominance violations are just 3%, 2% and 3% of all choices, while in minimal framings dominance violations are 67%, 81% and 57% of all choices. This is a strong failure of frame invariance.
Results: Structural Parameter Estimates and Mixture Models
We also have subjects' choice data from the 60 estimation pairs, designed to better identify preference parameters than we could using only our 40 test pairs. We use 94 of the 100 total pairs 8 to estimate parametric probabilistic choice specifications of EU, RDU, and SWUP. We regard our sampled population as (possibly) consisting of subpopulations, each composed of either EU, or RDU, or SWUP types, and estimate seven specifications of such a population: three specifications that assume our sampled population is composed solely of one type (either EU, or RDU, or SWUP); three specifications that assume our sampled population is a mixture of just two of the three types; and a specification that assumes all three types exist in our sampled population. The specifications composed of just EU and SWUP types, or of just EU and RDU types, are mixtures of rational agents (EU) and behavioral agents (either SWUP or RDU). This interpretation of comparing EU and SWUP is further motivated by the observation that EU is grounded in basic normative axioms and SWUP is grounded in basic psychological principles of perception. The mixture model of RDU and SWUP can be interpreted as comparing agents who value alternatives in isolation with context-independent preferences (RDU) and agents who choose by comparing alternatives jointly and who are sensitive to context and framing (SWUP).
The specification containing all three types (EU, RDU, and SWUP) has a novel interpretation.
Kahneman (2003) distinguishes three cognitive systems that he refers to as 'perception', 'System 1', and 'System 2'. We might conjecture that a different decision model is best suited for each system, given that they engage in different processes. Since RDU allows for optimism and pessimism to influence decisions under risk, RDU seems a plausible candidate for a model of affective decision making. In addition, Barberis et al. (2013) have argued that prospect theory (which coincides with RDU in our experiment) is a natural model of System 1 decision making. To the extent that System 2 decision making resembles an unbiased rational agent, it seems plausible that EU is an appropriate model for System 2. Since SWUP explicitly models salience perception and visual changes in the framing of decisions, it seems plausible that SWUP captures some aspects of perception-based choice. The final mixture model combining all three theories thus allows for "System 2" agents (represented by EU), "System 1" agents (represented by RDU), and "Perceptual" agents (represented by SWUP). A similar interpretation holds even without a multi-system framework: People may decide based on different heuristics, where some people typically choose the lottery that 'looks better' (represented in our analysis by SWUP), others typically choose the lottery that 'feels better' (represented by their degree of optimism or pessimism as modeled by RDU), and that others choose the lottery that they can 'justify as better' through logical reasoning (represented by their conformance to EU). Given that choices may be arrived at by such diverse decision processes, it may be that a different decision model is best suited for each of these modes of decision making.
For each agent of each type, is the degree of utility or value function curvature, very similar to a coefficient of relative risk aversion. 9 We allow subjects of all three types (EU, RDU and SWUP) to have their own personal but we require that has a normal distribution with mean and variance and (allowed to be specific to each type found in any mixture). The parameter is an inverse standard deviation of decision noise, frequently called precision or sensitivity in literature on probabilistic choice models. All three types (EU, RDU and SWUP) have the three parameters , and in their choice models. Agents of the RDU type additionally have a weighting function and we use a two-parameter ( and ) form due to Prelec (1998) for this weighting function. 10 The mixture parameters (such as ) are the proportion of the sampled population behaving according to each ∈ { , , }. Although simple and parameter-free, (10) does not satisfy IPS. Given behaviors such as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, and the simultaneous purchase of lottery tickets and insurance policies that follow from IPS (Leland and Schneider, 2017) , along with the general form of the Allais common ratio effect, it seems desirable for a salience function to also satisfy that property. Therefore we introduce a new salience function satisfying IPS. To motivate this, consider the two frames in Figure 11 : the salience function in (10) assigns the same salience value to the comparison between 300 and 100 in both frames (σ(300,100) = 0.5). But perhaps that comparison is more salient in the top frame in Figure 11 (in which other payoffs are in the hundreds of dollars, in which case $200 is a big difference) than in the bottom frame in Figure 11 (where other payoffs are in the thousands of dollars, and the difference between 300 and 100 seems smaller). for all outcomes (or all probabilities) in a frame. Let ( , ) denote a vector of length 2 , formed by horizontally concatenating a pair of like dimension vectors in a frame (i.e., all outcomes in a frame, or all probabilities in a frame); and let ‖ , ‖ denote the Euclidean norm of the vector ( , ). A context-dependent parameter-free IPS salience function can be defined as in (11):
This satisfies IPS for any frame, and under (11) the salience of (300, 100) is greater in the top frame in Figure 11 than in the bottom frame. We use this salience function for the SWUP type in our estimations. Table 2 shows the results of our estimations of seven specifications. The fit (the negative log likelihood in the last row of Table 2 ) of the mixture of EU and SWUP is only exceeded by specifications that nest it (the mixture of RDU and SWUP, and the mixture of all three types). RDU has the best fit among singletype specifications, but keep several points in mind. First, RDU has two more preference parameters (its weighting function parameters) than do EU or SWUP; second, of the 94 pairs used in our estimations, 76 pairs are in minimal frames-what we regard as the standard presentation that RDU was essentially designed for; and third, the six stochastic dominance pairs excluded from our estimation are also the pairs in which EU and RDU performs worst (among all 100 pairs) and SWUP performs best. In the three-type specification, the largest sub-population is represented by SWUP (comprising 43% of the overall population), with RDU and EU representing, respectively, 37% and 20% of the population.
Minimal and Transparent Frames for Choice over Time: Present Bias and the Hidden Zero Effect
Consider the minimal frames in Figure 12 . The stationarity axiom of Discounted Utility theory implies that people should choose either and ′ or and ′. However, in choices such as these, experiments show that people frequently choose and ′, a finding termed present bias (Laibson, 1997) . Present bias occurs in the minimal frames in Figure 12 since the comparison between receiving money today versus in one year is more salient than the comparison of $75 versus $100, but this monetary comparison is more salient than receiving payment in 10 years or 11 years. One might make a different prediction in transparent frames, however, based on the intuition that the focal comparisons in both choices are between $75 and $0 and between $100 and $0. Indeed, switching from minimal to transparent frames provides a formal explanation of the hidden zero effect (Magen et al., 2008; Radu et al., 2011; Read et al., 2017) in which behavior becomes more patient when the opportunity costs of income (such as receiving $0 instead of $100 in 1 year) are made salient. Transparent frames retain the second choice of ′ over ′ from minimal frames, but shift the first choice toward preferring over via the hidden zero effect. The prediction of more patient behavior in transparent frames is also consistent with the finding by Fisher and Rangel (2014) that shifting attention from focusing on time to focusing on money reduces impatience since transparent frames increase the salience of the money dimension relative to minimal frames. Transparent frames may thus serve to induce more patient behavior and more time consistent behavior. SWUP predicts that ambiguity aversion will be observed in minimal frames but mitigated by transparent frames. Figure 13 depicts two choice pairs {A, B} and {A′, B′} in minimal frames as Schneider, Leland, and Wilcox (2016) presented them to subjects. After making 60 such choices, one of the 60 choices is randomly selected for payoff: Suppose this was pair {A, B} and the subject chose B. The subject then draws a ticket from a bag, and if the ticket is red she plays a lottery in which there is a 75% chance of winning $25 and a 25% chance of winning nothing. If the ticket is blue, she instead plays a lottery in which there is a 25% chance of winning $25 and a 75% chance of winning nothing. But notice that if she had chosen option A instead, she would play a lottery offering a 50% chance of winning $25 and a 50% chance of winning nothing irrespective of the ticket color. The pair {A′, B′} is similar except that in option B′ the "good" state is reversed. For these minimal frames, the experiment replicates Ellsberg's Paradox, finding that people do not assign well-defined subjective probabilities to states, but rather prefer alternatives with known probabilities over unknown probabilities-a preference pattern called ambiguity aversion. state). Diminishing absolute sensitivity implies a focal thinker will be more sensitive to the latter comparison. Similarly, A′ is chosen over B′ in the bottom panel of Figure 13 , yielding ambiguity aversion. Figure 14 shows Ellsberg-style choices in transparent frames. If the decision maker has a uniform prior over red and blue ticket states, then SWUP predicts ambiguity aversion in minimal frames, and ambiguityneutrality (indifference between A and B) in transparent frames. Ambiguity neutrality in transparent frames follows from symmetry of , in which case (13) holds:
(13) 0.5 (0,25)(−6.25) + 0.5 (25, 0)(6.25) = 0.
The transparent frame focuses attention on comparing $0 and $25 rather than probabilities. If the decision maker has a uniform prior over red and blue ticket states, then a focal thinker exhibits ambiguity aversion in minimal frames, and ambiguity-neutrality (indifference between A and B) in transparent frames. Schneider, Leland, and Wilcox (2016) considered the simple setting of a world with two types of agents -those who are ambiguity-averse (agents who always choose A), and those who are ambiguityneutral (agents who randomize between A and B with equal probability). They computed the unique proportion of ambiguity neutral agents which exactly fits the distribution of ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking choices observed in their experimental data, for both minimal and transparent frames.
This approach estimated there to be about 43% ambiguity-neutral agents in minimal frames but 63% ambiguity neutral agents in transparent frames. While this framing effect is predicted by SWUP, we are not aware of an alternative model that predicts this frame-dependence of ambiguity aversion. 
Summary
We now gather our results on framing effects for risk, time, and ambiguity in three propositions. Earlier in sections 4, 6 and 7 we illustrated the claims in Proposition 1: formal demonstrations appear in our SM.
Proposition 1 (Minimal Frames and Behavioral Biases):
A focal thinker with linear utility ( ) = and either the BGS salience function (10) or our IPS salience function (11):
(i) violates stochastic dominance in the minimal frame in Figure 3; (ii) exhibits the Allais paradox in the minimal frames in Figure 4; (iii) exhibits the common ratio effect in the minimal frames in Figure 5; (iv) exhibits present bias in the minimal frames in Figure 12 (for annual discount factor ∈ [0.41, 0.95]); (v) and exhibits Ellsberg's paradox in the minimal frames in Figure 13 .
For minimal frames, we prove more general results regarding two of the most robust and most wellknown violations of expected utility theory: the Allais common ratio effect and the Ellsberg paradox.
Although these paradoxes are two of the oldest violations of rational choice theory, there has been relatively little work investigating the precise relationship between them. Proposition 2 is proved in our Appendix, for general versions of the Allais common ratio effect and Ellsberg's paradox also defined in the Appendix. Proposition 2 is general and establishes that two basic properties of the perceptual system (greater sensitivity to larger absolute differences for a fixed ratio (IPS), and greater sensitivity to larger ratios for a fixed absolute difference (DAS)) directly imply the most robust violations of expected utility theory without any parametric assumptions regarding the form of the agent's salience functions or utility functions.
Without defining them precisely, Savage (1954) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued that transparent presentations would reduce violations of rational choice theory. We formalized 'transparent presentation' of choice alternatives for risk, ambiguity, and time using a set of properties which imply unique transparent frames. With this done we can now state a theorem concerning transparent framesconverting a long-standing suggestion into a set of falsifiable statements. Consider four types of systematic violations of rational choice theory: violations of stochastic dominance, Allais paradox violations of expected utility theory, present biased violations of discounted utility theory, and Ellsberg paradox violations of subjective expected utility theory. We show they should all vanish under our definition of transparent framing: This Transparent Frame Theorem is proved in our Appendix.
Proposition 3 (Transparent Frame Theorem): For transparent frames, a focal thinker will not exhibit the following violations of rational choice theory, even if the focal thinker exhibits them in minimal frames: (i) Violations of Stochastic Dominance (ii) Allais Paradox violations of Expected Utility theory (iii) Common Ratio violations of Expected Utility theory (iv) Present Bias violations of Discounted Utility theory (v) Ellsberg Paradox violations of Subjective Expected Utility theory
The transparent frame theorem is general in that it does not depend on the form of the decision maker's salience functions or on the form of the decision maker's utility function or discount factor or subjective beliefs, or on the particular parameter values used for the paradoxes, and it applies to choices across the domains of risk, time, and uncertainty.
For risk, transparent frames are similar to the state matrices employed by Savage (1954) (but implying neither correlation nor independence between payoffs) and to the 'canonical split form' of Birnbaum and Schmidt's (2015) tree presentation of lotteries, but are distinct in that the canonical split form does not separate common consequences from distinct consequences. For decisions under risk, minimal frames are related to Birnbaum's (1999) tree presentation of lotteries in 'coalesced form:' In particular, a choice set in which all lotteries are in coalesced form generates a minimal frame. We are not aware of any previous attempt to formalize different presentation formats for income streams.
We suggest two avenues for subsequent research. First, one might apply SWUP to choices between complex multiple outcome gambles and investigate whether it can explain novel findings such as data supporting the probability of winning heuristic (Venkatraman, Payne, and Huettel, 2014) . Second, one might normalize salience weights to sum to one (see our probabilistic choice model for SWUP in our SM).
One might interpret such normalized salience weights as the distribution of attention across the column vectors in the frame. Eye-tracking studies might then test whether subjects focus on particular comparisons in proportion to these normalized weights.
Our definitions of frames and our formal distinctions between minimal and transparent frames provide a unified foundation for analyzing choice presentations across three major domains of individual choice.
Combine that foundation with a decision model that operates on frames (such as SWUP), and a formal logic of framing effects emerges. Our foundation may also be a useful tool to help control for non-random variation in experiments or decision analysis. We found, for instance, that changes from minimal to transparent frames for the same choice alternatives can generate increases in the proportion of safe choices by 20 to 30 percentage points. This is a large and systematic shift in risk preferences arising from small changes in framing. Earlier work by Harless (1992) , Starmer and Sugden (1993) , Humphrey (1995) , and by Birnbaum and colleagues (e.g., Birnbaum and Chavez 1997; Birnbaum and Navarrete 1998) also observed significant framing effects for risk due to changes in presentation formats.
The same mathematical structure-and the same psychological intuition-explains a variety of the most robust and well-known behavioral biases across the domains of risk, uncertainty, and time, violating four of the most well-known axioms in rational choice theory (stochastic dominance, independence, stationarity, and the sure-thing principle). Focal thinkers will violate these axioms in minimal frames but satisfy them in transparent frames. Evidence from previous literature and from our own experiment suggests that biases are reduced, but not eliminated, when the presentation of choice alternatives is made transparent.
Appendix
Here, ≻ � ( � ) means that for focal thinkers, option 'looks strictly better than' ('looks indifferent to') option when a frame ⟦ , ⟧ (of type specified in each proposition) presents the choice pair { , }.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2 (Allais and Ellsberg in Minimal Frames)
We define the general form of the Allais common ratio effect below: 
Proof of Proposition 2 (ii):
This proof is for Ellsberg's two-color paradox. An analogous argument resolves Ellsberg's three-color paradox. Let denote the number of red balls in Urn 2. Since the number of black balls is 100 − , the state of the urn is fully characterized by . For each state, the presentation for Choice 1 is given by Figure A .2, where ( ) is the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn 2 in state .
Without loss of generality, we normalize the payoffs such that ( ) = 1, and ( ) = 0. For a focal thinker, A is chosen over B if and only if inequality (14) holds. Under a uniform prior, (14) becomes (15): The following result is immediate. In (3-ii), ( ) is the overall probability of outcome in lottery , and is the probability of outcome in the jth payoff column vector in the frame. Note that ∑ < : = is the cumulative probability of outcome that is summed over the preceding columns in the frame. The expression for ensures that either the entire remaining probability mass for outcome or for outcome will be completely used in column in the frame. The algorithm for computing these probabilities (property (3-ii)) thus ensures compactness (the frame has the fewest cells subject to satisfying properties (1), (2), (3-i), and (4)) and it ensures completeness -the probabilities in each row vector of the frame sum to 1. The algorithm in (3-ii) also ensures uniqueness (the frame is uniquely defined even for lotteries with different support sizes), and it is constructive, by specifying how to generate the frame given any pair of lotteries. Proof of Proposition 6 (Uniqueness of Transparent Frames: Risk): By monotonicity, the display of the maximal common consequences is strictly monotonic, and thereby unique. For distinct consequences, monotonicity, in conjunction with the algorithm for , (alignment properties (3-i) and (3-ii) uniquely determines each subsequent cell in the frame and so the frame is unique (There is only one possible specification implied by for each probability and corresponding payoff column vector for each cell ∈ ( + 1, + )). ∎ 15
Definition 9 (Transparent Frame: Time): A transparent frame ⟦ , ⟧ for income streams , ∈ is the special case of the frame in the bottom panel of Figure 1 that satisfies the following properties.
(1) Common Consequence Separation: Common consequences are separated from distinct consequences such that common consequences are adjacent and distinct consequences are adjacent as in Figure A .8 16 .
(2) Alignment: = for all . 15 Note that in the cases of transparent risk frames, both alignment properties (3-i) and (3-ii) are used to confer uniqueness. For choices over time, we only require an alignment property similar to (3-i). 16 In Figure A the ordering of the periods in the frame is uniquely determined and the frame is unique. ∎
